Abstract. This paper proposes an approach to verify information flow security of concurrent programs. It discusses a hyperproperty called observational determinism which aims to ensure secure information flow in concurrent programs, and proves how this hyperproperty can be verified by stutter equivalence checking. More precisely, it defines observational determinism in terms of stutter equivalence of all traces having the same low initial value and shows how stutter trace equivalence can be verified by computing a divergence stutter bisimulation quotient. The approach is illustrated by verifying a small example.
Introduction
To perform an effective security analysis of a given program, program model, security policy and attacker (observer) model should be defined precisely [1] . In secure information flow analysis, the program model can be represented as a state machine, which produces a set of executions and is considered public knowledge. In this model, program variables are classified into different security levels. A nave classification is to label some variables as L, meaning low security, public information; and other variables as H, meaning high security, private information. The goal of a security policy is to prevent information in H from flowing to L and being leaked [2] , [3] . Other classifications of program variables are possible via a lattice of security levels [4] . In this case, the security policy should ensure that information flows only upwards in the lattice.
The security policy is a property that needs to be satisfied by the program model. The attacker is assumed to be able to observe program executions. Confidentiality policies are of major concern in security policies. These policies are connected to the ability of an attacker to distinguish two program executions that differ only in their confidential inputs. Noninterference is a confidentiality policy that stipulates an observer able to see only low security data (low observer) learns nothing about high security inputs by watching low security outputs [5] . Observational determinism is another confidentiality policy which is a generalized notion of noninterference for concurrent programs. Inspired by earlier work by McLean [6] This paper concentrates on the problem of verifying observational determinism for concurrent programs. We define observational determinism in terms of stutter equivalence on all low variables. Our contributions include (1) a theorem showing that verifying secure information flow can be reduced to equivalence checking in the quotient system and (2) a sound model checking approach for verifying secure information flow in concurrent programs. In fact, our approach is the first that uses quotient space to reduce the state space and check for secure information flow simultaneously. We illustrate the progress made by the verification of a small example program. It is expected that these contributions constitute a significant step towards more widely applicable secure information flow analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, preliminaries are explained. In section 3, observational determinism is formally defined and section 4 discusses how to verify it. In section 5, some related work is discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes, and discusses future work.
Preliminaries
In this section, at first we introduce the program model considered throughout the paper. Then, some preliminary concepts about bisimulation are discussed. Most of these preliminaries are taken from [10] .
Definition 1 (Kripke structure). A Kripke structure KS is a tuple (S, → , I, AP, La) where S is a set of states, →⊆ S × S is a transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP is the set of atomic propositions, 
